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This paper studies career concerns in teams where the support a worker receives depends on
fellow team memberse¤ort and ability. In this setting, by exerting e¤ort and providing support,
a worker can inuence her own and her teammatesperformances in order to bias the learning
process in her favor. To manipulate the markets assessments, we argue that in equilibrium, a
worker has incentives to help or even sabotage her colleagues in order to signal that she is of
higher ability. In a multiperiod stationary framework, we show that the stationary level of work
e¤ort is above and help e¤ort is below their e¢ cient levels. We also examine career concerns
with explicit contracts.
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1 Introduction
Modern corporations launch innovative employment practices in the workplace, including team-
work, job rotation and problem-solving groups, to raise productivity and prots.1 However, providing
team incentives creates challenges. Workers, who may be subject to explicit incentives that arise from
compensation contracts, may also be involved in productive activities for free. A prominent exam-
ple is the development of open source software.2 Top programmers contribute freely to this process
because there are delayed rewards (Lerner & Tirole (2002)). They have implicit incentives that arise
from career concerns; i.e., concerns about the e¤ect of reputation on external labor markets and thus
on future remuneration.3 In the open source mode, the market can see outcomes and whether the
problem was addressed in a clever way (Von Hippel & Von Krogh (2003)).4 In turn, a programmer
is able to signal her talent to peers and prospective employers, thereby increasing future monetary
payments. However, due to the collaborative nature of this activity (Weber (2004)), the individual
outcome also depends on the contribution and thus the qualities of fellow team members.
This paper studies career concerns in teams where the support a worker receives depends on
fellow team memberse¤ort and ability. We address the questions of how the learning process about
a workers ability is shaped by teamwork interactions and how career concerns arise in this setting.
A workers e¤ort and ability are inputs in her teammatesproduction functions. Thus, by exerting
e¤ort and providing support, a worker can inuence her own and her teammatesperformances in
order to manipulate the markets assessments about her own ability. We argue that in equilibrium, a
worker has incentives either to help or even to sabotage her colleagues, in order to bias the learning
process in her favor. The existing literature on career concerns in teams, based on Auriol, Friebel &
Pechlivanos (2002), assumes that a teammates support depends exclusively on her teammatese¤ort
(not ability). The learning process about a workers ability is therefore independent of the quality of
fellow team members and her career concerns depend exclusively on her own performance.
We employ Holmströms (1982, 1999) career concerns framework, in which neither the workers
nor the market know workersinnate abilities and both learn from past performances. We consider
1The 5th European Working Conditions Survey (2012) reports that the pace of respondentswork depends on
direct control of their boss (43% in all workplaces), production or performance targets (47%), and work done by
colleagues (45%). The 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Study about British workplaces nds that the incidence
of methods for knowledge transmission and teamwork interactions are considerable; i.e., meetings involving all sta¤
(in 80% of workplaces), team briengs (60%) and problem solving groups (14%).
2Apache, Linux, Perl and Sendmail, among others, are developed as open source software. The national value of
Europes investment in free/libre/open-source (FLOSS) software in 2006 is 22 billion euros representing 20.5% of total
software investment. In USA, this value is 36 billion (in euros) (Ghosh (2007)).
3Explicit incentives to perform a job or a task are provided through explicit contractual commitments by a principal.
However, implicit incentives arise when principals competing in a labor market have some ex post discretion how to
respond to an agents performance. This agent has implicit incentives to change her current e¤ort in order to inuence
the learning process about her ability and thus increase her future payments.
4The Apache project makes a point of recognizing all contributors on its website,
http://httpd.apache.org/contributors/#colm. Kogut & Metiu (2000) state that many programmers reportedly
believe that being a member of the LINUX community commands a $10,000 premium on annual wages. Hann,
Roberts, Slaughter & Fielding (2004) argue that star programmers are an order of magnitude more productive than
their peers, so there is much to signal.
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a simple setting with two agents who work and interact for two periods. Agents consider work
and help as two separate tasks, and have task-specic cost functions. A workers "project" output
is observable and linear in her own innate ability and "work" e¤ort, her teammates support, and
a transitory shock. The support a teammate provides also depends on her own "help" e¤ort and
ability; i.e., the teammates ability matters for an agents performance. Agentsabilities and the
transitory shocks are independently and normally distributed. Additionally, we consider di¤erent
degrees of initiated and received teamwork interactions; i.e., the fraction of a teammates support
that is appropriated by an agent may di¤er from the fraction of an agents help that increases a
teammates production.
The dependence of future rewards on past performances plays a key role in agentslabor supply.
The market draws inferences about the levels of agentsabilities via current project outputs. Since
labor is a substitute for ability, an agent can inuence the learning process in her favor by distorting
both her e¤orts upwards.5 What complicates inferences is that because both teammatesabilities are
inputs in the production function, an agents project output as a signal of her own ability is noisier.
However, her colleagues output also conveys information.
By exerting work and help e¤ort, an agent can inuence both performance measures and ma-
nipulate market perceptions. If the initiated interactions are strong enough relative to the received
interactions so that an agents support has a great impact on her colleagues production, the market
attributes high performance by a teammate to the agents ability and revises its assessment about the
ability upwards. In this case, we argue that an agent has incentives to work and help her colleague
in order to build up her reputation. The opposite occurs if received interactions are strong enough
relative to initiated interactions. High performance by a teammate is attributed to the teammates
ability. This causes the market to put a negative weight on that performance when forecasting an
agents ability. In this case, an agents help will increase the teammates performance further, which
biases the learning process against her. Thus, an agent now has incentives to sabotage her colleague.
She can induce an upward revision of her own ability only by destroying some part of her teammates
production.
This analysis shows that what matters for career concerns is how many components of the produc-
tion and learning process an agent can a¤ect in order to shape the markets assessments. An agent
cashes in a reputational bonus that increases with e¤ort exertion and support provision or sabotage.
Holmström (1982) studies career concerns when there are no interactions, while Auriol et al. (2002)
assume that the support an agent receives depends exclusively on her colleagues e¤ort. In their
model, by looking at a teammates performance, the market cannot draw any additional information
about an agents ability. The process of inference about each teammates ability is independent and
5Empirical studies nd evidence for the existence of career concerns for professionals (Gibbons & Murphy (1992)),
and for economists (Coupe, Smeets & Warzynski (2006)); i.e., past performance and the probability of promotion are
positively related, and the sensitivity of promotion to performance declines with experience, indicating the presence
of a learning process. Borland (1992) provides a survey.
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the quality of fellow team members has no e¤ect on an agents reputation incentives.
This paper also investigates Famas (1980) conjecture that career concerns induce agents to behave
e¢ ciently. Holmström (1999) formalizes this idea by considering a "stationary" single-agent model
where ability is not xed but uctuates over time, thereby preventing the market from fully learning
its level. He states that if there is no discounting, Famas result is correct: agents exert the e¢ cient
level of work e¤ort. We argue that in a multi-agent model where there are teamwork interactions and
the quality of fellow team members matters for an agents decisions, this result does not necessarily
hold. In particular, if initiated interactions occur, even though there is no discounting, the stationary
work e¤ort is higher and help e¤ort lower than their e¢ cient levels. Because we add noise to the
learning process, both performance measures become more vague. An agent can more e¤ectively
shape the markets assessments by increasing her own project output, and thus the work e¤ort is
distorted upwards, while the help e¤ort is distorted downwards. The balance between the reputation
incentives in a stationary model indicates that an agent is oriented to focus on tasks that increase her
own project output, dragging her attention from helping or sabotaging her teammate. In a stationary
equilibrium, career concerns induce an agent to over-provide work e¤ort.
An agents stationary e¤ort levels are e¢ cient only in two cases, provided that there is no discount-
ing. On the one hand, this happens as long as an agents ability is not an input in her teammates
production function as in the settings of Holmström (1999) and Auriol et al. (2002), although re-
ceived interactions may occur. A teammates output as a performance measure should not convey
any information about an agents ability and hence has no e¤ect on reputation incentives. In this
case, the supplied work e¤ort is e¢ cient regardless of the intensity of received interactions, and thus
of how noisy the signal of an agents performance is about her own ability. Exerting zero help e¤ort
is also e¢ cient. On the other hand, e¢ cient e¤ort levels are obtained in a stationary setting as long
as both initiated and received interactions are perfect, implying that agents work and help e¤orts
need to be equally productive.
We extend the analysis to examine team incentives when explicit contracts are provided. We
consider a risk-neutral principal who appoints two risk-averse agents whose individual outputs are
observable and contractible, allowing the principal to treat agents separately through individual-
based schemes (Itoh (1992), Auriol et al. (2002)). The incentive packages are derived in a linear
principal-agent model (Holmström & Milgrom (1987), Gibbons & Murphy (1992)) and are based
on explicit comparisons of team members outputs.6 The existing literature uses such contracts
when the market shocks that hit agentsproduction are correlated. In our setting, market shocks
are independent. However, as in Chalioti (2015), individual outputs are correlated due to teamwork
6Some principal-agent models allow both parties to hold some bargaining power (e.g., Pitchford (1998)) while other
models assume that either party can make a take-it-or-leave-ito¤er (e.g., Mookherjee & Ray (2002)). Bernhardt
(1995) studies how the composition of an agents skills and the non-observability of her ability a¤ect wage and promotion
paths. Ferrer (2010) studies the e¤ects of lawyerscareer concerns on litigation when the outcome of a trial depends
on the opposing lawyerse¤ort and abilities. Bilanakos (2013) argues that the provision of general training increases
the workers bargaining power vis-à-vis the employer.
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interactions. Team-incentive contracts are the consequence of the e¢ cient use of information conveyed
by both performance measures about an agents e¤ort and ability.
The optimal contractual parameter based on an agents own project output is always positive,
indicating that higher agent performance is rewarded with a higher payment. However, the sign of
the contractual parameter based on her teammates output is less clear cut. If initiated interactions
are large enough, the principal rewards the agent for the support she provides to her colleague.
In contrast, if the market and the principal anticipate that initiated interactions are small and an
agents contribution in her teammates production is insignicant, the principal penalizes the agent
when the teammate performs better by setting this contractual parameter negative. The principal
now lters out the e¤ect of teamwork interactions from agents compensation. Implicit sabotage
incentives now arise due to an agents increasing willingness to persuade the principal that she is
teamed with a less productive teammate. An agent wants to signal that she is the more productive
team member in absolute and relative terms. In fact, an agent has implicit incentives to induce a
downward readjustment of the markets assessment of her colleagues ability. This happens because
a colleagues reputation cannot benet the agent. She is unable to capitalize on the increase in her
colleagues bonus; it hurts her instead. In particular, if the teammate is perceived as being highly
productive, the principal expects to pay a large part of the compensation through the contractual
incentive components.7 Given that individual remuneration is pinned down by the outside option,
the xed part of the salary will decrease, making an agent worse o¤.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on career concerns in teams where the ratchet
e¤ect or sabotage incentives arise. Lazear (1989) considers sabotage incentives in tournaments that
arise because explicit payments condition the reward of an agent negatively on her colleaguesperfor-
mances. In Auriol et al. (2002), explicit contracts are provided and the source of sabotage incentives
is a lack of commitment by the principal. In a two-agent model, Meyer & Vickers (1997) use Holm-
ströms (1999) production function where an agents e¤ort and ability only matters for her own
outcome. Thus, an agent cannot inuence anothers production. However, the learning process
depends on whether agents abilities are correlated. They argue that because there is a positive
externality, each agent free-rides on the e¤ort of the other to enhance reputation. Due to free-riding,
reputation incentives are weakened and the ratchet e¤ect arises. Agents have a decreasing willingness
to work. In our setting, the teammatesinnate characteristics are independent, but due to teamwork
interactions, an agent has incentives to take action in order to a¤ect her teammatesperformance.
Even if no explicit contracts are provided, an agent exerts e¤ort either to help her teammate or sab-
otage her by destroying some part of her production. Incentives to sabotage arise when the market
puts a negative weight on a teammates performance when predicting an agents ability.
The literature on moral hazard problems remains narrow in its focus on whether market forces
7Dewatripont, Jewitt & Tirole (1999) argue that the implicit and explicit incentives are substitutes in a production
function where the inputs are additive, while they may become complements if the agents ability is multiplicative to
her e¤ort. Andersson (2002) provides a discussion on unobservable contracts.
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alone can remove them. Fama (1980) states that there will be no need for explicit contracts in order to
solve the principal-agent conicts. The market already provides e¢ cient implicit contracts, inducing
the "right" level of labor supply. Holmström (1999) shows that risk-aversion and discounting place
limitations on the markets ability to urge adequate incentives. However, if these limitations are
lifted in a stationary model, agents exert e¢ cient e¤ort levels. Bar-Isaac & Hörner (2014) consider
an agent who has di¤erent abilities - specialized and generalized abilities - to perform two tasks.
They compare the value of specializing with acting as a generalist in an innite-horizon model and
nd that, if there is no discounting, the stationary level of e¤ort is also e¢ cient. Bonatti & Hörner
(2014) consider a dynamic framework with exponential learning. We show that in our model where
teammatesabilities a¤ect their reputation incentives, the stationary levels of e¤orts on both tasks
are ine¢ cient. The stationary work e¤ort is higher and the help e¤ort is lower than their e¢ cient
levels. Thus, the work e¤ort is distorted upwards and the help e¤ort is distorted downwards.
This paper is also tied to the literature on team incentives when the degree of visibility of an
agents characteristics is an issue. In team production models, the market only observes the team
output and uses this (single) measure to infer the level of workersabilities. Ortega (2003) examines
the e¤ect of the allocation of power within the rm on workerscareer concerns, where power confers
visibility: as an agent becomes more visible, the visibility of her colleague must decline. He argues
that uneven allocation of authority is optimal. Jeon (1996) shows the optimality of equal sharing of
the team output among workers as well as the advantage of mixing young and old workers in a team.
Bar-Isaac (2007) analyzes workersincentives to work for their own reputations when young but for
their rmsreputation when old. Arya & Mittendorf (2011) examine the desirability of aggregate
performance measures in models with reputation incentives. They assume that an agent can impact
multiple dimensions of a rms operation and the output of each operation depends on her own e¤ort
and ability. E¤ort can inuence all signals to varying degrees. There are no teamwork interactions
and the process of inference of an agents ability depends only on her own e¤orts. They argue that
an aggregate signal of the outputs of these operations can improve e¢ ciency. In a single agent model,
Dewatripont, Jewitt & Tirole (2000) consider multitasking and claim that increasing the number of
tasks reduces the total e¤ort because performance becomes noisier. Dewatripont et al. (1999) use
a production function where an agents e¤ort and ability are multiplicative and argue that what
matters is market expectations about focus on a task and not observability of tasks as in an additive
case. They also examine incentives under a "fuzzy mission" where the market is ignorant about the
allocation of an agents e¤ort across tasks. In a di¤erent setting, E¢ nger & Polborn (2001) assume
that an agent is most valuable if she is the only smart agent. If this value is su¢ ciently large, the
other expert opposes her predecessors report. Antiherdingmay result.
In our two-agent model, individual project outputs are observable (separate signals) and subject
to market shocks that are independent of each other. Teammatesabilities are also uncorrelated. The
degree of visibility of agentsabilities changes with teamwork interactions that also make individual
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production noisier. This happens because a teammates ability a¤ects an agents project output.
However, a teammates performance also conveys information about an agents ability and it is likely
that the signals will be jointly more informative. In our model, what drives the optimal reputation
incentives is not the amount of available information about teammates abilities per se, but how
agentsperformances are related. An agents attempts to shape the markets assessments may induce
her to exert ine¢ ciently high work e¤ort, and help or sabotage her teammate, even in the absence of
explicit motivation.8 ;9 This model can be used to analyze reputation incentives of team workers when
their individual performance depends on the quality of fellow members. This is likely to happen in
research collaborations or even in sports teams.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. It discusses the process of learning
about abilities and the e¤ect of teamwork interactions on the amount of available information. Section
3 solves the game and derives teammatesreputation incentives in a setting where there is no explicit
motivation. The optimal incentives to help or sabotage are analyzed. We also discuss the reputation
incentives when market shocks are correlated. In section 4, we consider a multiperiod model and
focus on the stationary level of labor supply. In section 5, we derive the optimal incentives when
explicit contracts are also provided. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
This section describes the model where no contingent contracts can be made and thus only
reputation (implicit) incentives arise. We assume that there are two e¤ort-averse agents 1 and 2,
indexed by i and j where i 6= j. Agents are also rational and forward-looking. Employment lasts for
two periods indexed by t = f1; 2g, and at each period, each agent carries out her own project.
2.1 Production technology
Agents are engaged in a stochastic production process. At each period t, agent is "project"
output, zit, depends on her own innate ability, 
i, her "work" e¤ort, eit, and a transitory shock, "
i
t.
In addition, zit depends on the teammates support, 
j + ajt , weighted by a parameter hj, where
0  hj  1:
zit = 





The teammates innate ability, j, and her "help" e¤ort, ajt , increase agent is project output in an
additive way. Thus, each agent exerts work e¤ort to accomplish her own project as well as help e¤ort
8Heterogeneous teams in terms of seniority or learning by doing are beyond the scope of this analysis.
9Milgrom & Oster (1987) study the role of a workers visibility in the job market: the abilities of visible workers are
known to all parties while those of invisibles are concealed by an employer from other potential employers. Mukherjee
(2008) examines a rms decision to disclose information about its workersproductivity.
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to improve her colleagues performance.10
When agent i enters the labor market, her ability is not known with certainty. However, all
parties share the common prior that abilities are independently and identically distributed, where
i is drawn from a normal distribution with mean mi1 and variance 
2
i . Prendergast & Topel (1996)
consider i as the t between the agent and her job that is contingent on some systemic variation,
(symmetrically) unknown to all parties at each stage.11 The parameter hj measures the degree of
received teamwork interactions - the fraction of agent js support that is appropriated by agent i - and
hi indicates the degree of initiated interactions - the fraction of agent is support that contributes
to agent js production. These parameters may di¤er. They are also exogenous and lie in [0; 1].
Teamwork interactions are value-creating and their intensity depends on the characteristics of the
technology used by each agent or, for instance, the degree of tacit knowledge required in production.
The fact that hi and hj are less than one reects the imperfect nature of teamwork interactions:
providing help to a fellow member of the team is (somewhat) less productive than putting e¤ort into
ones own task. The random terms "it, "
j
t are also independently and normally distributed, across
agents and periods, with zero mean and variance 2".
2.2 Learning process
In multi-agent career concerns models with uncorrelated shocks, the market updates from an
agents past performance in order to infer the level of her ability. In our model, teamwork interactions
occur and support also depends on the ability of the fellow member. Since the unknown j enters
agent is production function, agent is project output, zit, as a signal of her ability 
i becomes
noisier. Teamwork interactions weaken the link between an agents performance and her ability,
implying that this relationship becomes less autonomous and accountable. However, i is also an
input in the teammates production function. Therefore, zj1 also conveys information about agent is
ability. The market has two performance measures from which to draw inference about an agents
ability.
In Holmströms (1999) model where zit = 
i + eit + "
i
t, there are no interactions, while in a two






the support an agent receives depends exclusively on her colleagues e¤ort. There is no link between




= 0. Thus, the processes of inference of i and j are completely independent.
Following DeGroot (1970), Lemma 1 species the mean and variance of the conditional distribu-
tion of abilities after the realizations of zi1 and z
j
1. All parties (the market and the two teammates)
observe the outputs of both projects that are realized in the end of the rst period. We denote by bei1
and bai1 the market conjectures about agent is rst period e¤orts.
10The price of the outputs is normalized to one and the scale of production is identical in all t periods.
11La¤ont & Tirole (1988), among others, analyze the optimal incentives when an agent has private information
about her own ability before she goes to the market.
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Lemma 1 (Conditional distribution of abilities) Given the realizations of the rst-period project
outputs, zi1 and z
j
1 , the mean and variance of the conditional distribution of 
i in period 2 are
mi2  E











zi1   bei1   hjbaj1   hjmj1+ ij1  zj1   bej1  mj1   hibai1 ,
2i;2  var












where i1  1  ii1   hi
ij




























"   (1  hihj)hj2j

,















for all hi and hj.
Proof. In appendix (A:1).
Provided that all parties have rational expectations, the equilibrium conjectures must be correct:bei1 = ei1 and bai1 = ai1 . There are no o¤-equilibrium realizations of observables because of the presence
of noise. Each agent is compelled to exert the equilibrium e¤ort levels that are expected of her, since
working less will bias the learning process against her. Remark 1 highlights the informativeness of
the signals about an agents ability.12
Remark 1 (Informativeness of signals) (a) Given zj1, the conditional correlation between agent
is ability, i, and her own project output, zi1, is always positive: 
ii
1 > 0 for all hi and hj.
(b) Given zi1, the conditional correlation between agent is ability, 
i, and her teammates project
output, zj1, is positive as long as initiated interactions are substantial:










The coe¢ cient ii1 represents the correlation of agent is ability and her own project output, given





















for all hi and hj.
Thus, given the realization of her colleagues project output, an agents high "own" performance




= (1  )mi1 + 
















.  exceeds ii1 ,   ii1 , implying that the market puts a
lower weight on zi1 to perceive the level of 
i if another signal is also available. However, the two signals are jointly
more informative, allowing for a better estimate: ii1 + hi
ij
1   for all hi and hj .






















. Both are positive.
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signals high "own" ability and vice versa. If there are no teamwork interactions as in Holmström
(1999), or if support depends only on teammates e¤ort as in Auriol et al. (2002), the variance of












The correlation of i and zj1 is also zero.
In our model, zj1 conveys information about 
i, but the sign of the (conditional) correlation
coe¢ cient ij1 is less straightforward. The sign of 
ij
1 depends on the relative intensity of the degrees
of teamwork interactions (rather than on their absolute values) as well as on the variance of j and




















. Initiated interactions must be strong enough so that
agent js performance is sensitive to i, while received interactions, hj, must be weak (zi1 must not
be sensitive to j). If this is the case, both signals are more likely to reect the level of i. Thus,
given zi1, higher z
j
1 is "good news" for agent is ability. The market perceives that a high z
j
1 is due to
a high agent is ability and updates its assessments upwards. In the polar case where hj = 0, 
ij
1 is
positive for all hi.
The opposite occurs if received interactions, hj, are large enough while initiated interactions, hi,
are small. In this case, as zj1 increases, E





will increase for a given xed zi1. Hence, a
larger proportion of this zi1 will also be attributed to 
j rather than i, so that E






decrease. In particular, if hi is small and the variance of 
j is large enough, it is more likely that
both performance measures indicate the level of j. Thus, if both agents perform well, the market
attributes these outcomes to high j, causing the estimate of i to be updated downwards. Agent j
is now perceived as the high-quality member of the team. In the polar case where hi = 0, 
i does
not contribute to agent js project output at all. However, the market still uses this performance
measure to draw valuable information about j (and indirectly about i). Under these conditions,
given zi1, the market always puts a negative weight on z
j
1 to assess 
i: if hi = 0, 
ij
1 < 0 for all hj.
To obtain better insight, we also examine how the variances of i and j a¤ect the weights the





all hi and hj; (ii)
@ij1
@2i
> 0 if and only if ij1 > 0. As long as initiated interactions are strong enough
relative to the degree of received interactions so that a higher zi1 or z
j
1 is attributed to a higher
i, an increase in the variance of agent is ability, 2i , will trigger the market to rely more on both
signals. The market will be willing and able to learn more about i. On the other hand, we have: (i)
@ii1
@2j
< 0 if and only if ji1  corr
 








< 0 for all hi and hj. For
strong received now interactions (large hj), a teammates ability is key for an agents performance




1 is more likely to reect the level of 
j, while as a signal of




< 0. The opposite occurs when received interactions are weak (small
hj). To interpret this case, let us assume hj = 0, implying that agent is output is now independent
of j and ji1 < 0 for all hi. The negative sign of 
ji
1 indicates that given z
j
1, a higher z
i
1 is "bad news"
for agent j. The market attributes a higher zi1 to a higher 
i. An increase in 2j now works in favor
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of agent i and induces the market to rely more on an agents project output, zi1, to perceive the level





The variance of agentsabilities and the degrees of teamwork interactions also a¤ect the "total"
amount of available information in the market. Learning about abilities is captured by a decrease in













where 1 is given in Lemma 1. The market can obtain a better estimate of agent is ability as








Remark 2 (Information extraction & teamwork interactions) Given zi1 and z
j
1, the condi-





> 0, if and only if





< 0, for all hi.
[Figures 1 are about here.]






about i becomes more vague. The market nds it
harder to disentangle the contribution of agent is ability to both teammatesproject outputs and
the information conveyed by zi1 and z
j
1 about 
i is less pronounced. The market relies less on the
performance measures to assess agent is ability as the impact of j to zi1 increases. Similarly, as







about i to reveal less information. Nevertheless, if hi exceeds a threshold such that
ij1 becomes positive, the conditional variance of 
i decreases. In this regime, ii1 decreases with hi.
However, as agent is help matters more for agent js performance, zj1 becomes more informative.
The e¤ect of hi on z
j
1 exceeds that on z
i
1, making both signals jointly "speak" more about ability.
Higher hi helps the market to learn, resulting in better estimates of 
i.
2.3 Agentspreferences and objectives
In carrying out her own task and providing support to her teammate, agent i incurs disutility that
is task specic. The cost functions of work e¤ort and help e¤ort are  (eit) and  (a
i
t), respectively.
The function  (:) is twice continuously di¤erentiable and convex, implying that there are diminishing
returns to scale in the production process. We also assume that  0 (0) = 0, limeit!1  
















2" + (1  hihj)2j
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and limait!1  
0 (ait) = 1. Task-specic cost functions are used in multi-agent models as in Auriol
et al. (2002), and Itoh (1992). However, they are in stark contrast to other multitask models based
on Holmström & Milgrom (1991) that assume  (eit + a
i
t). In the latter models, the cross-partial
derivatives with respect to two e¤orts are positive. That is, tasks are (perfect) substitutes in an
agents cost function. These total-e¤ort-cost functions introduce negative externalities between a
given agents tasks. As an agent increases the e¤ort devoted to one task, the marginal cost of e¤ort
to the other task will grow larger. Thus, providing support to a teammate would be costly to an agent
and it crowds out e¤ort directed to her own task, decreasing her own project output. Agents care
for the sum of e¤ort exerted and the allocation of e¤ort between the tasks depends on the relative
benets an agent derives by these two tasks. In fact, the agent must equate the marginal return
to e¤ort in both tasks. These models focus on the allocation of an agents "attention" between the
tasks.
In our model with task-specic-cost functions, disaggregated information, and separation of tasks
- work e¤ort and help e¤ort are inputs in di¤erent production functions - benets of providing help or
sabotage emerge. Allocating a given total e¤ort to both tasks entails lower disutility. The cross-partial
of the cost function is zero, hence the cost of exerting e¤ort to perform a given task is independent of
the other task. An agent can focus on eliciting e¤ort to a¤ect her teammates project output without
having to consider simultaneously technologically founded externalities. Putting e¤ort in a task does
not require e¤ort away from the other task. There are benets from task-specic costs that can
emerge exactly when there is separation of tasks and each teammates project output is observable.
This cost function allows us to compare agentse¤ort decisions for the same tasks and capture the
results of inuencing another agents project output. Multitasking in the absence of crowding out
e¤ects between the tasks keep a worker highly motivated to exert e¤ort in environments where career
concerns are an issue.
Agent i receives the reward wit and has constant absolute risk-averse (CARA) preferences. She
derives utility
















where r is the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion, r > 0.15 This function is additively separable
across periods, implying that agents behave as if they have access to perfect capital markets. They
also do not discount the future.
Agent is reward is determined in equilibrium and depends on the available information conveyed
15Risk-aversion on the part of the agents is essential when explicit contracts are provided in order for the incentives
parameters to be less than one (in absolute terms). Otherwise, the optimal contract will impose substantial human
capital risk on the agents. If only implicit incentives arise, our results are also obtained with risk-neutrality; i.e., agent












. We consider risk-aversion in order to be consistent in both
settings.
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by both agentspast performance measures.16 ;17 A competitive market will set
wit = (1 + hi)E





+ beit + hibait  eit. (3)
Each agent receives a xed payment equal to the reputational bonus she can claim for her contribution
to both teammatesproject outputs. This bonus is the total rent an agent can get by exerting e¤ort
and providing support. Given the available information, her payment increases with an upward
revision of the markets estimate of her own ability.
3 Reputation incentives
We now solve the two-period game and derive the teammatesoptimal e¤orts. The conventional
wisdom in career concerns models is that an agent works harder at the beginning of her career in order
to improve her own performance and thus manipulate market assessments about her ability. We show
that in our multi-agent model where an agents ability inserts a fellow members production function,
additional reputation incentives arise. To inuence the learning process, under certain conditions, an
agent has incentives either to help or even to sabotage her colleague. Then, we perform this analysis
when the output shocks are correlated.
3.1 Work and help e¤ort
In period 2, agent i receives wi2 = (1 + hi)E





+ bei2 + hibai2. However, this reward does
not depend on her current actions. There are no career concerns and thus she exerts zero e¤ort:
ei2 = 0 and a
i










































= mi1. Given also that  (e
i
2 )













+ (1 + hi)E






Career concerns arise because the levels of current project outputs, zi1 and z
j
1, a¤ect the reputational
bonus (wage) in the second period. As long as ability is unknown, there are returns to supplying
labor, since past performances will inuence the marketsperceptions about i. Labor is a substitute
16The principals maximizes the sum of outputs minus the agentspayments. However, the competition among them
will drive their prots down to zero and each agent will receive her reputational bonus.
17Recall that t = f1; 2g. If employment lasts for T periods where T > 2, the markets perceptions of abilities will
depend on all past performances. The reputational bonus will be wit = (1 + hi)E
n
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for ability. Thus, by increasing labor supply, an agent can potentially bias the process of inference
in her favor. Proposition 1 presents the optimal e¤orts.18
Proposition 1 (Career concerns) In equilibrium, agent i has reputation (implicit) incentives to
work, increasing her own project output, as well as to help or sabotage her teammates production:
 0 (ei1 ) = (1 + hi) 
ii
1 and  




where ii1 and 
ij
1 are given in Lemma 1.
The optimal e¤orts are contingent on the measures that the market uses to draw inferences
about ability. In line with the literature, career concerns depend on the weight the market puts on
outputs in estimating ability. However, we argue that what also matters for career concerns is how
many components of the production process and the learning process an agent can a¤ect in order
to manipulate the markets perceptions in her favor and how many "pieces" of future remuneration
depend on an agents current actions. By exerting work e¤ort in the current period and providing
support, an agent a¤ects both teammatesperformance measures, zi1 and z
j
1, in order to induce an
upward revision of the markets estimate of her own ability. Thus, an agent has two tools available
to use to shape the markets assessments. In Auriol et al. (2002) where the support an agent receives
depends only on her teammates e¤ort (not on her ability) and the market shocks are not correlated,
market assessments about agent is ability only depend on her own performance. Thus, providing
support has no e¤ect on an agents future remuneration. Agent is utility-maximizing help e¤ort is






and independent of the degrees of teamwork interactions.
In our model, additional reputation incentives arise. Agent i exerts e¤ort to increase her future
remuneration by M ii1  (1 + hi) ii1 through her work and by M
ij
1  (1 + hi)hi
ij
1 through help or
sabotage. In particular, if initiated interactions are strong enough (large hi) relative to the degree of
received interactions hj so that 
ij
1 > 0, agent i anticipates that good teammate performance (high
zj1) will entail an upward revision of the markets estimate of her own ability, 
i. Therefore, she
has additional incentives to help her colleague, M ij1 > 0. However, for a small hi so that 
ij
1 < 0,
such reputation incentives are reversed, M ij1 < 0. If initiated interactions are weak, a higher z
j
1 is
attributed to j and the market updates its assessments about i downwards. Thus, by helping a
teammate to further increase her project output, agent i will induce market inferences to be revised
against her. Instead, a bad performance by her teammate will be a good signal about her own ability.








+ "it for any i and j. The reputational
bonus now is E
n




+ (1  hi) beit + hibait. This normalization serves to guarantee that agents tend to put
e¤ort in both tasks exactly in order to manipulate markets perceptions rather than because the "pie" gets larger





= (1  hi) corr











i; zj1 j zi1

, which can
be either positive or negative.
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A decrease in zj1 will increase agent is reputation so that she now has incentives to sabotage her
colleague. We can interpret negative e¤ort as hiding, stealing or even destroying some part of a
teammates project output. In the polar case where "one-way" teamwork interactions occur - hi > 0
while hj = 0 - agent i always has incentives to help.
This analysis boils down to the following: agent i has stronger reputation incentives as more
pieces of information during the learning process depend on current actions and as the impact of the
estimate of i on future remuneration increases. An agent always has incentives to exert work e¤ort
in order to increase her own project output. As long as a teammates performance is sensitive to
agents own ability so that ij1 > 0, we argue that this agent has additional incentives to help her
colleague in order to build up her reputation. In contrast, if the impact of an agents support to her
teammates performance is insignicant so that the market puts a negative weight on her teammates
output to estimate her ability, ij1 < 0, an increase in z
j
1 will bias the learning process against her.
Thus, incentives to sabotage her teammate arise.
[Figures 2 are about here.]
We can also compare the teammatese¤ort decisions, given the di¤erences in the variance of their
abilities.19 In particular, if received and initiated interactions are identical, hi = hj, the agent with
the higher variance of ability, say 2i > 
2
j , exerts more work e¤ort,  
0 (ei1 ) >  
0  ej1 , and help e¤ort,
 0 (ai1 ) >  
0  aj1 . Due to higher 2i , the market is able to draw additional information about i, and
agent is attempts to manipulate market perceptions are more e¤ective. More generally, as long as
the interactions initiated by the agent with the higher variance, 2i > 
2
j , are large enough relative to
the intensity of received interactions, this agent exerts more work and help e¤ort than her colleague.
The market anticipates that this agents e¤orts are key determinants of both project outputs and
relies more on both signals that likely reect the level of her ability.20
3.2 Correlated output shocks
We analyze the reputation incentives when the transitory shocks, "it and "
j
t , are correlated.






denotes the correlation coe¢ cient, where jj  1. The type of correlation
(positive or negative) may depend on whether the team members use similar or di¤erent technologies

































for any hi, hj and 2".
20One can also consider the degrees of teamwork interactions to be decision variables; i.e., agents decide how much









+ "it. There are now multiple equilibria. The optimal e¤orts satisfy  











1 and  
0  bi1  = 1 + bj1  ii1 mj + ej1  for any i and j. Dewatripont et al. (1999) assume
that agent is (work) e¤ort is multiplied with her ownability, and thus career concerns depend only on the mean of
i, and not on j as in our setting.
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in production.21 Now, there are two "forms" of correlation between the team members project
outputs: one due to teamwork interactions and one due to the correlation of the random terms. Given
the realized performances zi1 and z
j
1, the correlation coe¢ cients of the (conditional) distribution of 
i
are eii1 = 2ie1 (1  hi)2" + (1  hihj)2j and eij1 = 
2
ie1 (hi   )2"   (1  hihj)hj2j ,
where e1 = 4"  1  2+ (1  hihj)2 2i2j + 2" (1 + h2i )2i +  1 + h2j2j   2  hi2i + hj2j.
Teammatesproject outputs are informative about an agents ability as long as at least one form
of correlation is imperfect. If hi = hj =  = 1, both performance measures are identical and the
market cannot draw any information about an agents ability: eii1 = eij1 = 0 for any i and j. Thus,
teammates give up on inuencing the markets perceptions. There are no career concerns.
In settings where there is some degree of asymmetry in performance measures - i.e., hi, hj or
 are less than one - the correlation coe¢ cient eii1 is always positive, eii1 > 0. Given the team-
mates performance, an agents higher project output is attributed to her own higher ability and
vice versa. However, the e¤ect of an increase in  on eii1 and thus on the intensity of an agents






j = 1 and
hj = 0 in order to isolate the e¤ects of hi and  on agent ireputation incentives. If  = 0:9 while
hi = 0:1, we have
@eii1
@
> 0: agent is contribution in zj1 is negligible, but the observation of this
additional signal e¤ectively reduces the variance of the "noise" of her own project, "i1, allowing the
market to put a higher weight on zi1 in estimating 
i. Thus, an increase in the correlation between
the output shocks leads an agent to exert higher work e¤ort in order to build up her reputation.22
The relationship between ei1 and  becomes negative,
@eii1
@
< 0, when  = 0:1 while hi = 0:9.
Assuming that agent i does not receive any help while her support is critical to her teammates
performance, high project outputs are mainly attributed to her own ability. The market perceives
that both signals indicate the level of i and thus, given zj1, z
i
1 is a good estimate of its level. However,
as  increases and the market accumulates more information about the market conditions, a lower
weight is put on zi1 in estimating 
i. As the priorvariance of the noise terms decreases and the
market factors a¤ect teammatesproject outputs the same way (recall hj = 0), the market anticipates
that both teammatesgood performances are inuenced by market factors, revising the estimate of
i downwards. Thus, higher correlation between the shocks will decrease agent is optimal work
e¤ort. However, if a teammates support in agent is project output is signicant (say hj = 1), the
derivative @eii1
@
becomes positive, because now additional information about the market environment
will be nothing else but useful. If cross-agent teamwork interactions are intensive, the market nds it
harder to perceive the levels of the s. Thus, as  increases, the market can better identify whether
21For instance, one can consider a team that produces hard disks but the team members use di¤erent technologies;
i.e., magnetic and holographic. A market shock may hit the output of the projects that are based on these two
technologies in a di¤erent way.




j = 1 and hj = 0, for  < 0, we have
@eii1
@ < 0 for any hi.
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the outputs signal the level of teammatesabilities or are inuenced by marketwide factors.
This analysis highlights that given the available information, a larger  will discourage agent i to
exert work e¤ort if this increase leads to a worse market estimate of i. More precisely, an increase
in a small  > 0 will decrease agent is optimal work e¤ort when initiated interactions, hi, are strong
enough while received interactions, hj, are weak:
@ 0(ei1 )
@
< 0 if and only if
 <





















Meyer & Vickers (1997) also examine the relationship between reputation incentives and the
correlation of the output shocks. They consider a two-agent setting in which each agents output
depends only on her own e¤ort and ability, as in Holmström (1999). They nd that when agents
output shocks are correlated (while their abilities are independent), a larger correlation , where
 > 0, leads an agent to exert higher e¤ort, ei1 , in order to increase her reputation. There is a negative
externality and some rivalry between agents. The observation of another agents outcome exactly
reduces the variance of the "noise" and allows the market to rely more on an agents performance
to infer the level of her own ability.23 This e¤ect is also present in our setting where teamwork
interactions occur. However, we argue that this relationship can turn out to be negative when hi is
large enough while hj is small, where an increase in  induces the market to decrease the weight it
puts on agent is project output to perceive the level of her ability.
The sign of eij1 is also not clear cut. It depends on the relative intensity of the two forms of
correlation between the project outputs. For eij1 to be positive, initiated interactions, hi, must be
su¢ ciently large in order for i to be a key determinant of zj1. For instance, if the market shocks
vary substantially (high 2") and are negatively correlated,  < 0, eij1 is more "likely" to be positive.
A high realization of zi1 should be associated with a low z
j
1. However, if agent js project output is
also high, this is attributed to high i, especially for relatively intensive initiated interactions hi. In
turn, agent i cashes in an increase in her reputational bonus due to a higher zj1 and thus, she has
incentives to help her fellow member.
Remark 3 (Di¤erent forms of correlation of performance measures & help e¤ort) An agent
will have reputation incentives to help a teammate when initiated interactions are substantially larger
than the correlation of the output shocks:  0 (ai1 ) > 0 if and only if hi  
2j
2"
hj (1  hihj) > .
[Figures 3 are about here.]
In a setting where the random shocks are positively correlated,  > 0, but  exceeds hi,  > hi,
then eij1 is negative. This happens because the contribution of i in zj1 is relatively small and high
23Meyer & Vickers (1997) argue that this relationship between reputation incentives and the correlation of the output
shocks is the counterpart of the insurance e¤ect in a static principal-agent model where "comparative performance
information" compensation schemes are provided. The observation of another agents output increases the precision
with which an agents e¤ort is estimated, leading the principal to provide additional motivation.
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teammates project outputs are mainly attributed to market factors. The market believes that
the teammates act in a favorable environment and updates its assessments about i downwards.
Therefore, there is some rivalry between the agents and incentives to sabotage arise.
4 Multiperiod models
We now focus on career concerns when employment extends to many periods and the output
shocks are uncorrelated. We also use a stationary model as in Holmström (1999) to examine whether
the equilibrium e¤orts are e¢ cient under the assumption that the quality of a fellow member of a
team matters for an agents reputation.
4.1 The T-period case
At each period t, the markets assessments of abilities now depend on the history of agent






t 1. The optimal e¤orts satisfy the equations  





 and  

















"   (   1) (1  hihj)hj2j

,
where   4" + (   1)
2 (1  hihj)2 2i2j + (   1)2"










In line with the literature, the signal ii is always positive but decreasing in  . The returns to
an agents work e¤ort are bigger the more uncertainty there is about her ability. Thus, early in the
process when there is less available information, the market puts more weight on the most recent
output observation when updating its assessments about i. Eventually, i will be revealed almost
completely and new output observations will have little impact on market perceptions. For small hi,
the presence of teamwork interactions slows down the learning process about i. However, agent is
attempts to inuence output are only temporarily e¤ective (only early in career). In this multi-period
setting, the signal ij deserves special attention.
Remark 4 (Signals over the periods) For strong initiated interactions (large hi), ij is positive






The signal ij may even switch signs, from positive to negative, as  increases. Note that al-
though the variance of a performance measure depends on the variance of its transitory shock -








" - the covariance of project outputs realized in the same or di¤er-





















j . Thus, over the periods, the noise in the performance measures driven by
the output shocks becomes (relatively) less signicant in the process of estimating abilities. To put
it di¤erently, the signals incorporate information about the covariances of all project outputs that
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have been realized in the past. Under the assumption of independently distributed random terms,




"), implying that over the periods, the noise in-
troduced by teammatesabilities matters more in the learning process and for reputation incentives.
Thus, even when teamwork interactions are such that the market puts a positive weight on agent js
project outputs to infer the level of i early in the process, as performance observations accumulate,
ij diminishes. At later stages of an agents career, as 
j becomes key in predicting i, this signal can
turn out to be negative. As the market learns more about j by observing zjt , agent is reputation
incentives reverse and, in fact, she has incentives to sabotage. Even if early in the process an agent
has incentives to help her colleague, sabotage incentives can arise for those agents who are about to
retire.
4.2 The stationary case
We now investigate the relationship between the intensity of reputation incentives over time and
the e¢ cient level of e¤orts in a stationary setting where teammatesabilities remain unknown to
the parties. In this setting, we can examine whether agentsdesire to shape market perceptions in
order to increase future remuneration can induce them to exert the "right" level of e¤orts. We also
need to assume that the agents discount the future by some factor . For higher , agents put a
lower weight on the future and thus value the "delayed" payments less. Provided that career concerns
arise exactly because of agentsattempts to increase their reputation, seeking higher future monetary
payments, such incentives will be stronger in a setting with no discounting. However, the presence
of discounting in this analysis will allow for additional insights on whether the market forces alone
can remove the moral hazard problems and provide adequate incentives for workers to perform.
In line with the literature based on Holmström (1999), we assume that the ability uctuates over






where it is independently and normally distributed with zero mean and variance 
2
. Thus, at period














+ "it+1. The shocks 
i
t and
jt add uncertainty that prevents agentsabilities from becoming fully known. Lemma 2 derives the
variance of it+1 in this stationary setting.
Lemma 2 (Stationary variance) Let b2i;t  2i;t  1  iit   hiijt  be the variance of it+1 before
observing the realizations of zit+1 and z
j




t+1, the stationary variance of
agent is ability at t+ 1 is
2i;t+1 =
 b2i;t + 2  1  biit   hibijt  ,
where biit  b2i;t + 2bit

2" + (1  hihj)




"   (1  hihj)hj
 b2j;t + 2 ,
E. Chalioti: Teammatesability & career concerns 19
and bit  4" + (1  hihj)2  b2i;t + 2  b2j;t + 2+ 2" (1 + h2i )  b2i;t + 2+  1 + h2j  b2j;t + 2.
The learning process becomes
mit+1 = bitmit + biit  zit   beit   hjbajt   hjmjt+ bijt  zjt   bejt  mjt   hibait ,
where bit = 1   biit   hibijt . The shocks it and jt prevent the market from learning, and thus the



















  Tait. (5)
In period 1, we have  0 (ei1 ) to be given by the sum of the terms  (1 + hi)bii1 , 2 (1 + hi)bii1 bi2,





=  (1 + hi)bii h1 + bi + 2  bi2 + 3  bi3 + :::i ,
where the sum in the brackets is equal to 1







 (1 + hi)bii
1  
 




1  bii   hibij . (6)
Holmström (1999) formalizes Famas (1980) major conclusion that the market induces the agents
to exert the e¢ cient e¤ort levels. In a single-agent model, he shows that this happens if there is no
discounting. We argue that in our model where the team members interact and an agents individual
performance depends on the quality of her team, even if there is no discounting, for hi > 0, Famas
conclusion generically fails. The stationary levels of e¤orts are above or below their e¢ cient levels.
We perform this analysis by discussing rst the only two cases where teammatesstationary e¤ort
levels are also e¢ cient in our model.
Under full information (rst-best), agent is remuneration is a xed payment equal to the sum
of the disutilities of work and help e¤orts,  (eit) +  (a
i













= hi, respectively. The rst-best reward at each
period t is the reward that is optimal in a one-shot game.
Agent is stationary work and help e¤orts are e¢ cient as long as there is no discounting,  = 1,
and an agents ability does not a¤ect her teammates project output, hi = 0, as in Holmström (1999)
and Auriol et al. (2002), although received interactions may occur, hj > 0 (agent js stationary e¤orts
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will be ine¢ cient). Therefore, bij as a signal should play no role in agent is reputation decisions.




= 1. Since an
agents help e¤ort does not a¤ect the process of inference about her own ability, any incentive to
inuence a teammates performance disappears. Exerting zero help e¤ort in a stationary model is





It is rather striking that in our model where teammatesabilities matter for reputation concerns,
the stationary e¤ort levels can also be e¢ cient as long as the initiated and received interactions are
perfect, hi = hj = 1. Now, providing help to a colleague is as productive as putting e¤ort into ones
own task. An agents help and work e¤orts weight equally to both performance measures. Under full








= 1. The stationary e¤orts
also satisfy  0 (ei) =  0 (ai) =  0 (ej) =  0 (aj) = 1. They become e¢ cient as soon as we add any
amount of noise in the learning process about agentsability levels. There is a balance between the
incentives to work and help in order to build up reputation. Proposition 2 establishes that in our
model, under any other condition, Famas conclusion does not hold.
Proposition 2 (Stationary labor supply) In the stationary model where 2 > 0 and 
2
" > 0, for
all hj 2 (0; 1), if initiated teamwork interactions occur, hi > 0, agent i exerts










In the stationary case where hj < 1, for any hi, an agents work e¤ort is higher and help e¤ort
is lower than its e¢ cient level. Agent i has incentives to distort her work e¤ort upwards in order
to signal that she is of higher ability and induce the market to revise its beliefs in her favor. The
stationary reputation incentives indicate that an agent is oriented to exert more work e¤ort in order
to improve her own performance, rather than to focus on helping or sabotaging her colleague. The
optimal ai is distorted downwards. Thus, agents will overprovide work e¤ort and underprovide help
e¤ort. For small initiated interactions such that bij < 0, the stationary level of help e¤ort can even
be negative, while its e¢ cient level is always positive.
To complete this analysis, we also need to examine the convergence to the stationary state. We
need to explore reputation incentives before a stationary state is reached. In Holmström (1999),




t + (1  vit) zit, where zit = i + eit + "it and vit > 0, implying
that the convergence of an agents e¤ort to the stationary state is directly related to the dynamics
of vit. In our model, bit incorporates both signals biit and biit . Thus, the sequence of bit will depend
on the amount of information extracted by both signals, biit + hibiit , in each period. However, the
convergence of an agents work e¤ort will depend on the dynamics of biit , while the convergence of
help e¤ort will depend on the dynamics of bijt .
We show in Appendix (A:2) that the sequence of agent is optimal work e¤ort feit g converges
monotonically to the stationary state level ei, given by equation (6). If
biit 	 is an increasing
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, and the convergence of feit g is from below. Similarly, if biit is a decreasing
sequence, the convergence of feit g is from above. The same dynamics govern the convergence of
fait g to its stationary level. If (positive or negative)
bijt 	 is an increasing sequence, the convergence
of fait g is from below, while if
bijt 	 is a decreasing sequence, fait g converges from above to the
stationary state.
5 Explicit contracts
We now examine career concerns in the presence of teamwork interactions when explicit contracts
are provided and employment lasts for two periods.24 We assume that the agents are appointed by
a risk-neutral and prot-seeking principal. Their project outputs are observable and contractible,
allowing the principal to deal with each agent separately as in Itoh (1991, 1992). The principal and





makes a contract o¤er
to each teammate.
! Production stage:
If the agent accepts the o¤er,
she chooses e¤ort levels, ei1 and a
i
1.
Events beyond the agentscontrol
occur, the outputs are determined,




and update their beliefs.
A new contract o¤er is
made to each teammate.
! Production stage:
If the agent stays in the rm,
she makes e¤ort
choices, ei2 and a
i
2. The outputs
are realized and the
contracts are executed.
Figure 4. Timing of the game
5.1 Principals problem
The contracts depend linearly on both agentsproject outputs since the latter are correlated
due to teamwork interactions. Holmström & Milgrom (1987) establish that in a model much like the
single-period version of this model (but lacking the uncertainty about an agents ability), the optimal
contract is linear.25 Gibbons & Murphy (1992), in a single-agent model, and Auriol et al. (2002), in
their multi-agent framework, also consider contracts that are linear in outputs.
Holmström (1999) also argues that, for a risk-neutral agent whose payo¤ is linear in the poste-
rior belief about her ability, there is no divergence between the agents e¤ort decision to build up
reputation and the rst best, provided that the market can observe her project output. Reputation
incentives distort the agents e¤ort away from rst best only if she is risk averse or the production
technology is nonlinear in agents ability so that the process of inference about her ability is also
nonlinear. The intuition is as follows. Assuming linear contracts, the agents expected payment is
exactly based on the prior assessment of her ability. Thus, a risk-neutral agent is willing to exert
the "right" level of e¤ort from the principals perspective. Reputation incentives matter only if the
agent is risk averse or her wage is nonlinear in the posterior of her ability. Both these assumptions
24The model where employment lasts for T periods is solved in Appendix (A:5).
25Holmström & Milgrom (1987) show that in a static version of their dynamic model, the optimal compensation
scheme that is o¤ered to an agent with CARA preferences is a linear function of the performance measures.
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serve to guarantee that there is no symmetry between the risk faced by the rm and the risk face
by the agent. Gibbons & Murphy (1992) consider explicit payments and state that risk-aversion is
necessary so that optimal contracts do not completely eliminate career concerns. In particular, a
risk-averse agent wishes to be insured against low realizations of her project output, and thus weaker
explicit incentives are provided. Given that explicit payments will decrease, reputation incentives
will increase.
Relative performance evaluations provide a richer information base on which to write contracts
and allow the principal to better assess agent is e¤orts and ability. Teamwork interactions necessitate
the use of two-piece rate contracts, which promote e¢ ciency in designing incentives. In particular,

























t are the incentive parameters. Such "team-
incentive" schemes introduce either cooperation or competition between the teammates, depending
on the sign of it.
As in Gibbons & Murphy (1992) and Auriol et al. (2002), we also assume that side-contracts
between agents are not possible and long-term (multiperiod) contracts are not feasible.26 In par-
ticular, the second-period contracts depend implicitly on zi1 and z
j
1 rather than explicitly through
commitment at the beginning of the rst period. That is, at each period, agents choose the most
attractive contract o¤ers. This assumption also allows us to derive the substitutive relationship be-
tween implicit and explicit incentives: the contractual incentives should be strong when reputation
incentives are weak.
In case that an agent rejects the contract o¤er, she receives an outside option that equals her
reputational bonus eit, given by equation (3).27 Competing employers cannot make a better o¤er
than eit. The principal is equally well-o¤ by hiring either a high reputation agent at a high wage or
a low reputation agent at a low wage. This bargaining outcome can arise as the equilibrium of an
extensive-form game. In this game, an agent is randomly assigned to a prospective principal and
queues with the other job applicants. The principal makes a contract o¤er to the rst agent in line.
If the agent accepts the o¤er, she works for this principal. Otherwise, the agent queues for another
job and the principal makes an o¤er to the next agent in line. Therefore, each agent receives only
26If a principal can commit herself to a second-period salary before the observation of the rst-period outputs,
the principal succeeds in insulating an agentsexpected life-time compensation from the uncertainty she faces with
respect to all team memberstrue abilities. An agents problem is identical in each period. However, in our model,
the principal cannot commit to such long-term schemes. A new contract is o¤ered in every period, after observing
the realizations of past performances. Such contracts will depend on these observations and reputation incentives will
arise.
27Gibbons & Murphy (1992), Holmström (1999), among others, assume that the agent has all the bargaining power,
and thus the principal maximizes subject to a zero-prot condition. In a multi-agent setting, this assumption would
be problematic. Following Auriol et al. (2002), we consider a bargaining process that e¤ectively makes each teammate
the residual claimant only to her reputational bonus. One can also verify that if we set i2 = 
i
2 = 0, the equilibrium
implicit incentives in our setting (derived in subsection 5:2) are as in Proposition 1.
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her reputational bonus that arises due to work and support provision.
The principal is the residual claimant on rms net prots, which equal the sum of the project































subject to eit = argmaxeit E
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ait = argmaxait E















 eit, 8i,t (IRit)








, guarantee that, in each period t, an
agent chooses the (expected) utility maximizing e¤orts. The individual rationality constraint (IRit)
shows that the agent will participate in the production process only if her expected utility of doing
so exceeds her outside option. We recursively solve this game.28
5.2 Equilibrium explicit incentives
In period 2, agent imaximizes the certainty equivalent of her utility that takes the mean-variance
form CEi2  E





   (ei2)   (ai2)  r2V ar





. For any value of i2 , the optimal
i2 is choosing to minimize the variance of the wage w
i
2. Thus, the optimal work e¤ort and help
e¤ort satisfy, respectively,
i2 =  
0  ei2  and hii2 =  0  ai2  . (8)
Each agent also accepts the contract that allows her to earn (at least) her reputational bonus: in
equilibrium, the IRi2 constraint is binding. The principal signs the most appealing contracts. Thus,
agent is base payment is
!i2 =
ei2   E i2zi2 + i2zj2 j zi1; zj1	+   ei2 +   ai2 + r2V ar wi2 j zi1; zj1	 , (9)
where the conditional variance of the wage is
V ar






























28In this multi-agent framework, the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) and the convexity of the dis-
tribution function condition (CDFC) are not su¢ cient for the rst-order approach to be valid as in a single-agent
setting. Itoh (1991) argues that, in a model with cross-agent interactions, a generalized CDFC for the joint probability
distribution of the outputs is needed and the wage schemes must be nondecreasing. The coe¢ cient of absolute risk
aversion must also not decline too fast. Our model with agentsCARA preferences, linear contracts and production
technologies satises all these assumptions and thus the rst-order approach applies.
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, where iit  2"+h2i2i;t+2j;t and 
ij
t  hi2i;t+hj2j;t











Proposition 3 (Relative performance evaluation) In the second period, the optimal
(a) pay-for-own-performance incentive parameter is positive, i2 > 0, for all hi and hj;
(b) pay-for-teammate-performance incentive parameter is negative, i2 < 0, and thus, agent i has








The positive sign of i2 indicates that an agents higher own project output is compensated with
a higher wage. The sign of i2 is less straightforward. The principal sets 
i
2 positive for low degrees
of risk aversion and strong initiated interactions (high hi) so that i2 > 0, giving the agent a long
position in her teammates performance. The principal anticipates the support an agent provides




is also higher in compensation packages that are rewritten to accommodate an increasing hi. The
higher hi is, the more valuable is the information conveyed by the colleagues project output, and
thus the use of relative performance evaluations becomes more essential. Such evaluation schemes can
e¤ectively be used as means of internalizing the positive e¤ects of providing support. In contrast, for
a high risk averse agent, if the initiated interactions are weak (low hi), i2 becomes negative: due to
risk-sharing and the fact that agent is contribution in her teammates project output is insignicant,
the principal infers that agent j is the high productivity worker in the team and penalizes agent i as
zj2 increases. By setting 
i
2 negative, the principal lters out the teamwork interactions from agent
is compensation. Recall also that the optimal i2 is such that it minimizes the variance of agent is
wage. In fact, for substantially high risk averse agents, it is likely the variance of her wage wi2 to be
minimized when i2 is negative.









2. Suppose also that agent j does not provide any support to agent i, hj = 0, while
the contribution of agent i to her teammate performance is signicant, provided that hi = 1. For
any degree of risk-aversion, the principal encourages agent i to help her teammate and compensates





i2 , while the principal decreases her teammates (agent









j2 . The principal provides
opposing incentives to team members.
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In period 1, agent i anticipates the implicit dependence of the second-period wage on the rst-




























ewi1 + wi2	 , (12)
where V ar f ewi1g = V ar fwi1g+ V ar f!i2 g+ 2Cov fwi1; !i2 g (see Appendix (A:3)). The optimal work









1 and  










1 . By equation (9), we have

































Agents are motivated by the total explicit incentives from the rst-period contract and the implicit
incentives from career concerns. In particular, current e¤ort only a¤ects the intercept of future wage
!i2 . This is because there are no wealth e¤ects in agentsutility and the production functions are
additive. Both agents have the same marginal product of e¤ort regardless of their true ability. In
turn, the second-period explicit incentives i2 , 
i




1 and thus of agent is
reputation.
By exerting more work e¤ort in the rst period, ei1, an agent gains from the subsequent increase
in her reputational bonus by (1 + hi) ii1 . However, because of the "explicit incentive component" of















interactions are strong so that i2 > 0, the principal anticipates that agent i will be assessed as being
of higher ability and the explicit incentive component of her future remuneration will be large. Thus,
the principal o¤ers a contract whose base payment increases by less than the increase in the agents
reputational bonus. However, if hi is small so that i2 < 0, the principal now perceives that the
explicit incentive component in the second period will also be small and does not lower the xed part
of the salary as much.
Implicit incentives also arise due to help e¤ort provision, captured by M ij1 . As long as agent is
contribution in a teammates project output is signicant (high hi) so that 
ij
1 > 0, by undertaking
more help e¤ort in the rst period, ai1, agent i gains from an improvement in her teammates per-
formance and thus from the subsequent increase in her own reputational bonus ei2. In particular, an
increase in zj1 will make agent i better o¤, since the principal will infer that agent i is a high pro-















, where ij1 + hj
jj




1 > 0. If initiated
interactions are weak (low hi) so that 
ij
1 < 0, M
ij
1 becomes negative. It is in agent is interest to
convince the principal that she is teamed with a lower productivity agent and thus she has implicit
E. Chalioti: Teammatesability & career concerns 26
incentives to sabotage. However, if i2 < 0, the second period explicit incentives now diminish agent
is appetite to sabotage. By setting i2 negative, the principal now makes agent i less interested in
destroying part of her teammates output in order to build up her own reputation. Thus, a negative
i2 encourages agent i to focus more on her own project in the rst-period rather than sabotaging
her teammate in her attempt to shape market assessments about her ability. From the principals
perspective, career motives can be either benecial or detrimental.
Sabotage incentives also arise in Auriol et al. (2002). However, the context and intuition di¤er. In
their model, agent is higher work e¤ort increases only the conditional priors of her own ability, while
her help e¤ort decreases the expectations about her colleagues ability. Thus, an agents reputation
incentives are straightforward: she wants to induce an upward revision of the markets estimate of i
and a downward revision of the estimate of j. Provided that agent i does not internalize any benets
of an increase in the estimate of j and her remuneration is determined by her outside option, the
optimal help e¤ort is always negative due to explicit motivation. In particular, the optimal rst-
period work e¤ort, ei1 , depends exclusively on 
i
2 , while the optimal a
i
1 depends exclusively on 
i
2 ;


















i;AFP2 > 0 and 
i;AFP
2 > 0. However, in our model, additional incentives arise, either through agents
attempts to increase their reputation or though explicit motivation. The reputation incentives that











Agentsincentives also di¤er from those in Lazear (1989) where sabotage incentives arise in tour-
naments because an agents compensation is conditioned negatively on her colleaguesperformances.
Using such schemes, agents may want to destroy other workersoutput rather than to work hard on
their own project. In our model, the optimal i2 can be positive. However, even if 
i
2 > 0, as long
as ij1 is negative, agent i has implicit incentives to sabotage. This result is also di¤erent from Meyer
& Vickers (1997) where the agentsabilities are correlated and implicit incentives are weakened due
to the ratchet e¤ect.
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own-performance
insurance e¤ect




29The principals problem in the rst period is solved in Appendix (A:4).
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where i1 




00(ai1 )]+rii1  00(ai1 )
and i1 




00(ai1 )]+rii1  00(ai1 )
(see
Appendix (A:4)). The coe¢ cients i1 and 
i
1 are positive and less than one.
We use this decomposition of the optimal explicit incentives in order to examine the underlying
e¤ects (this analysis is generalized in a T -period model, analyzed in Appendix (A:5)). There is the
noise reduction e¤ect that arises due to changes in the "amount" of available information about
ability. In the next period, as the market learns more about abilities and their conditional variance




2. Therefore, the optimal trade-o¤ between incentive provision and
insurance becomes better for the principal (over time), in the sense that lower risks are incurred







. Higher hi shifts the
incentive-insurance trade-o¤ towards the former even more.
The principal also adjusts the optimal explicit incentives to account for agentsreputation incen-
tives. Given that M ii1 > 0, the principal imposes a lower pay-for-own performance relation when the
optimal implicit incentives to work are stronger. Similarly, for high hi so thatM
ij
1 > 0, 
i
1 is adjusted
downwards. The opposite occurs and thus the optimal i1 increases when initiated interactions are
weak so that M ij1 < 0. The negative reputation incentives need to be undone by a higher 
i
1 .
Risk-aversion and uncertainty about abilities also induce each agent to require insurance against
low realizations of both i and j: the own-performance and teammate-performance (human capital)
insurance e¤ects arise. In particular, the principal o¤ers a contract that insures the agents against
the intertemporal risk they face. For large initiated interactions so that both i2 and 
i
2 are positive,
agents incur higher risk in the second period. Thus, the principal reduces the power of the rst-
period incentive scheme in order to share part of this risk. Both human capital insurance e¤ects
are negative, implying that lower i1 and 
i
1 can provide insurance against low realizations of both
agentsabilities. In our model, the principal provides additional insurance to agent i due to j taking
the form of a further reduction in i1 .
30 However, a negative i2 increases 
i
1 . In the second period,
relative performance evaluation schemes lter out the common uncertainty, allowing for a higher i1
in the rst period. In the absence of teamwork interactions as in Gibbons & Murphy (1992), the
teammate-performance human capital insurance e¤ect does not hold.
The compensation ratio e¤ect reects the relationship between the "e¤ective" incentives - the









is positive when the initiated interactions are strong enough so that the principal nds it optimal to
induce cooperation between the teammates. For low hi so that i1 becomes negative, the principal
induces competition between them.31
30The own-performance and teammate-performance human capital insurance e¤ects can be separated because
agents project outputs are observable and relative performance evaluation schemes are used. If learning is based
on an aggregate measure and wages are contingent on the team production, these two e¤ects are merged.
31Assuming that long-term contracts are not feasible is equivalent to assuming that long-term contracts exist but
must be Pareto e¢ cient at each period. Gibbons & Murphy (1992) show that a sequence of (optimal) short-term
contracts provides exactly the same incentives as the optimal renegotiation-proof long-term contract. This result also
holds in our model where the optimal pay-for-own and pay-for-teammate incentive parameters of the renegotiation-
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6 Conclusion
We examine career concerns in teams in a setting where there are interactions between the fellow
members of a team and the help an agent receives depends on both her colleaguese¤ort and innate
ability. Teamwork interactions a¤ect the learning process and are at the heart of this analysis. By
exerting e¤ort and providing support, an agent can a¤ect both her own and her teammates project
output. Thus, she can use both performance measures to induce the market to revise its assessment
about her own ability upwards.
We show that career concerns depend on how many signals the agent can a¤ect in order to ma-
nipulate the markets inference. In particular, we argue that if initiated interactions are substantial
so that an agents support is a key determinant of her teammates production, the agent has in-
centives to work and help her colleague. By providing support, an agent can signal that she is a
high-productivity agent. In contrast, if initiated interactions are weak and received interactions are
intensive so that the market updates its beliefs about an agents ability downwards when the colleague
performs well, sabotage incentives arise. This happens because an agents higher help e¤ort increases
a teammates performance, which biases the process of inference against her. Thus, the agent has
incentives to sabotage her teammate in order to signal that she is of higher ability and increase her
reputation. In a stationary model where we add uncertainty into the performance measures in order
for abilities to remain unknown, initiated interactions induce the agents to supply work e¤ort above
its e¢ cient level and help e¤ort below its e¢ cient level. The optimal implicit incentives are distorted
as long as teamwork interactions are imperfect and there is no discounting.
This model can be used to analyze reputation incentives of team workers when their individual
performance is observable and depends on the quality of fellow members. This is likely to happen in
research collaborations, sports or nance reams. There are also extensions and directions for future
work that are of special interest, using the present model as a reference point. For instance, one can
consider di¤erences in the mean of the distribution of teammatesability and address the question
of whether a researcher has incentives to be teamed with senior or junior colleagues. We can also
assume that a worker contributes to multiple projects and is teamed with di¤erent workers in each
of them. We can then examine if she has incentives to work in projects where teammatesability
is more visible or in projects where teammates are of lower productivity. The size of the team with
heterogeneous workers is another key determinant of career concerns. For instance, biotechnology
requires large teams and may lack the ability to break up large projects into small independent
modules, as is possible in the software industry.
Market conditions may also alter team workersincentives to signal their abilities. For instance,
the existence of a dominant competitor tends to align the goals of the team members, and thus
sabotage incentives may be weakened or even reversed. Competition may necessitate cooperation
within a heterogeneous group and reputation incentives may encourage support provision in order
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to ensure the success of the projects. If explicit contracts are provided, allowing for side payments
between the agents as well as for di¤erent allocations of the bargaining power may boost this analysis
further.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1: conditional distribution of abilities





































Following DeGroot (1970), after the observation of zi1 and z
j














zi1   bei1  mi1   hj  baj1 +mj1






































































































































A.2 Convergence to the stationary e¤ort levels
We rst elaborate the dynamics of the learning process. The sequence of its reveals how fast
updating about agent is ability occurs. In particular, the recursive relationship between the bits isbit+1 = 12+li(hi;hj) bit , where li (hi; hj) is always positive.32 ;33 Thus, bit+1 is increasing in bit. Stationarity
requires bit+1 = bit = bi, implying that bi = 1+ li2   (li) 12 1 + li4 12 , as in Holmström (1999). From






























































33If hi = hj = 0, as in Holmström (1999), li is equal to
2
2"
. If 2" is su¢ ciently larger than 
2
 so that l
i is close to




and updating about mit occurs quickly. In our model, if hi = 0 and hj = 1, teamwork interactions slow down learning
since li < 1, while they speed up learning if hi = 1 and hj = 0 since li > 1. li exceeds
2
2"
and thus bi is lower than
the stationary level of this measure in Holmströms model. The updating of mt occurs faster, diminishing the negative
e¤ects of discounting.
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and thus the system is stable. If one starts with bi1 that exceeds the stationary level, bi1 > bi, bit
will converge from above to bi, while if one starts with bi1 that is lower than the stationary level,bi1 < bi, bit will converge from below to bi.





=  (1 + hi)bii1 + 2 (1 + hi)bii1 bi2 + 3 (1 + hi)bii1 bi2bi3 + :::  Teit. (16)
Each term in (16) is increasing in bii1 , hence so is Teit. We can show that this positive relationship holds
by induction. Let s
 bii1   bii1 bi2bi3:::bis, which is increasing in bii1 , and thus, s  bii2  = bii2 bi3bi4:::bis+1.
We also have
s+1
 bii1  = bii1 bi2bi3:::bis+1 = bii1bii2 bi2s  bii2  .
The correlation coe¢ cients bii1 and bii2 are both positive. By the inductive hypothesis, s (:) is in-
creasing. Note that bi2 = 1   bii2   hiii bij2 = 2"bi2 2" +  1 + h2j  b2j;2 + 2. Thus, we have 1bii2 bi2 =
2"[2"+(1+h2j)(b2j;2+2)]
(b2i;2+2)[2"+(1 hihj)(b2j;2+2)] , which is decreasing in ii1 and thus increasing in bii1 . In turn, the positive
coe¢ cient bii1bii2 bi2 is also increasing in bii1 . It follows that s+1  bii1  and thus  0 (ei1 ) are also increasing
as functions of bii1 . It boils down to the following: if biit 	 is an increasing (decreasing) sequence,
Teit
	
is also an increasing (decreasing) sequence. The sequence of agent is optimal work e¤ort
feit g converges monotonically to the stationary state level ei. If
biit 	 is an increasing sequence, the
convergence of feit g is from below. Similarly, if
biit 	 is a decreasing sequence, the convergence of
feit g is from above.





=  (1 + hi)bij1 + 2 (1 + hi)bij1 bi2 + 3 (1 + hi)bij1 bi2bi3 + :::  Tait. (17)
The sign of each term in equation (17) is the same as the sign of bij1 . First, we will examine the
convergence to the stationary level of help e¤ort when this is positive. If each term in (17) is
increasing in (the positive) bij1 , the same is true for Tait. As above, we prove this statement by
induction. Suppose s
 bij1  = bij1 bi2bi3:::bis, which implies s  bij2  = bij2 bi3bi4:::bis+1. These sequences
give
s+1
 bij1  = bij1 bi2bi3:::bis+1 = bij1bij2 bi2s  bij2  .
We have 1bij2 bi2 = 2"[2"+(1+h2j)(b2j;2+2)](b2i;2+2)[hi2" (1 hihj)hj(b2j;2+2)] , which is increasing in bij1 . It follows that the co-
e¢ cient bij1bii2 bi2, the product s+1  bij1  and thus the optimal help e¤ort ai1 are also increasing in bij1 .
Therefore, if
bijt 	 is a positive and increasing sequence, Tait	 is also an increasing sequence. The
convergence of agent is optimal help e¤ort fait g to the stationary state level ai will be monotonically
from below. If
bijt 	 is a decreasing sequence, the convergence of fait g is from above.
We can perform the same analysis to examine the convergence to the stationary level of help
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e¤ort when this is negative. Now, s+1
 bij1  and s  bij2  are also negative. However, the coe¢ cientbij1bij2 i2 is positive and increasing in the negative bij1 . This coe¢ cient reinforces the dynamics of the
negative sequence of s (:). If





, and the convergence of fait g is from below. If
bijt 	 is a negative and decreasing
sequence, fait g converges from above to the stationary state.
A.3 Second period explicit incentives






zi2   !i2   i2zi2   i2z
j




























































Omitting details, the Kuhn-Tucker condition with respect to i2 gives  1+!i = 0, !i = 1, implying
that the IRi2 constraint binds at the optimum and the base payment is given by (9). Agent i accepts
a contract that allows her to earn her reputational bonus. Thus, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions become
@L2
@i




 0 or i  0, i

















































































































. Given also the equations in (8), the conditions with respect












































h2i (1  i2) 00 (ei2)
.
Solving with respect to i2 , we obtain the optimal pay-for-teammate performance parameter 
i
2
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The optimal i2 (equation (11)) is obtained by substituting i (equation (18)) into the condition with
respect to ei2.
A.4 First period explicit incentives
To nd the optimal contractual parameters in period 1, we rst need to derive the form of
V ar
ewi1 + wi2	 = V ar ewi1	+ V ar wi2	+ 2Cov ewi1; wi2	 , (19)
where
V ar
ewi1	 = V ar wi1	+ V ar !i2 	+ 2Cov wi1; !i2 	 . (20)




























Note that eit   E i2zi2 + i2zj2 j zi1; zj1	 =
= E
 




























zi1   bei1   hjbaj1+M ij1  zj1   bej1   hibai1+  1  i2 bei2 + hi  1  i2bai2   hji2baj2   i2bej2,
where M ii1 and M
ij















































































To obtain the variance of ewi1, let Bi1  i1 +M ii1 and  i1  i1 +M ij1 be the e¤ective pay-for-own
and pay-for-teammate performance parameters. Then, by (21), (22) and (23), the variance in (20)
becomes
V ar
ewi1	 =  Bi1 + hi i12 2i +  hjBi1 +  i12 2j + h Bi12 +   i12i2",
and the covariance of ewi1 and wi2 is
Cov
ewi1; wi2	 =  i2 + hii2  Bi1 + hi i12i +  hji2 + i2  hjBi1 +  i12j .
Therefore, equation (19) takes the form
V ar
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In period 1, the certainty equivalent of agent is utility is given by equation (12). Provided that the
IRi constraint binds and



































ewi1 + wi2	 .




































































  hi i1 = 0
These equations imply the optimal i1 and 
i
1 , given by equations (14) and (15).
A.5 The multi-period model













tional expectation of agent is project output in period t is
E





= mit 1 + beit + hj  mjt 1 + bajt ,
where mit 1 is exactly the markets expectation of agent is ability as of the beginning of period t.
After the observation of zit 1 and z
j
t 1, the signals that are used by the market to form its beliefs
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M ii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where iit  2" + h2i2i;t + 2j;t and 
ij
t  hi2i;t + hj2j;t. We





























00(ait )]+riit  00(ait )
and it 














































We can derive the contractual parameters of the contracts that are o¤ered in each period. These
optimal parameters change monotonically with t. They indicate that greater motivation is provided
explicitly over the periods, while reputation incentives decrease for those about to retire.
Figures 1. E¤ect of hi on learning, captured by ii1 + hi
ij
1 .
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Figures 1 show the changes in ii1 + hi
ij





and 2". In all three gures, it is also assumed that hj = 1.




Figures 2:1 and 2:2 show the e¤ect of teamwork interactions hi on the signals about 
i and j , respectively,
under the assumptions that 2i = 6, 
2
j = 3, 
2



























= 0. Figures 2:3
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Figures 3. E¤ect of the correlation of the random terms, , on the signal ij1 .
2i = 
2
j = 1, 
2




j = 6, 
2
" = 1
hi = 1, hj = 0
hi = 0, hj = 1






", hi and hj .
